The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.
Because it has never successfully been invoked, the convention method of amendment is surrounded by a lengthy list of questions.1 Footnote
The matter is treated comprehensively in C. Brickfield, Problems Relating to a Federal Constitutional Convention, 85th Congress, 1st Sess. (Comm. Print; House Judiciary Committee) (1957). A thorough and critical study of activity under the petition method can be found in R. Caplan , Constitutional Brinkmanship: Amending the Constitution by National Convention (1988) . When and how is a convention to be convened? Must the applications of the requisite number of states be identical or ask for substantially the same amendment, or merely deal with the same subject matter? Must the requisite number of petitions be contemporaneous with each other, substantially contemporaneous, or strung out over several years? Could a convention be limited to consideration of the amendment or the subject matter which it is called to consider? These are only a few of the obvious questions, and others lurk to be revealed on deeper consideration.2 Footnote
Id. See also Federal Constitutional Convention: Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Separation of Powers , 90th Congress, 1st Sess. (1967) . This method has been close to being used several times. Only one state was lacking when the Senate finally permitted passage of an amendment providing for the direct election of senators.3 Footnote
C. Brickfield, Problems Relating to a Federal Constitutional Convention, 85th Congress, 1st sess. (Comm. Print; House Judiciary Committee) (1957), 7, 89. Two states were lacking in a petition drive for a constitutional limitation on income tax rates.4 Footnote
Id. at 8–9, 89 . The drive for an amendment to limit the Supreme Court's legislative apportionment decisions came within one state of the required number, and a proposal for a balanced budget amendment has been but two states short of the requisite number for some time.5 Footnote
R. Caplan , Constitutional Brinkmanship: Amending the Constitution by National Convention 73–78, 78–89 (1988) . Arguments existed in each instance against counting all the petitions, but the political realities no doubt are that if there is an authentic national movement underlying a petitioning by two-thirds of the states there will be a response by Congress.
Footnotes 1 The matter is treated comprehensively in C. Brickfield, Problems Relating to a Federal Constitutional Convention, 85th Congress, 1st Sess. (Comm. Print; House Judiciary Committee) (1957). A thorough and critical study of activity under the petition method can be found in R. Caplan , Constitutional Brinkmanship: Amending the Constitution by National Convention (1988) . 
2 Id. See also Federal Constitutional Convention: Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Separation of Powers , 90th Congress, 1st Sess. (1967) . 3 C. Brickfield, Problems Relating to a Federal Constitutional Convention, 85th Congress, 1st sess. (Comm. Print; House Judiciary Committee) (1957), 7, 89. 4 Id. at 8–9, 89 . 5 R. Caplan , Constitutional Brinkmanship: Amending the Constitution by National Convention 73–78, 78–89 (1988) .
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